ABSTRACT Private set intersection (PSI) is a fundamental cryptographic protocol, which has many important applications, such as personal properties matching, data sharing, or data mining. PSI has been widely studied in the literature, and many PSI protocols have been presented; however, today, many real-world applications do not use a secure PSI protocol, mainly because current PSI protocols have two issues: the insufficient efficiency and not considering the secure storage of users' datasets. Without using the PSI protocols, users of the real-world applications will sacrifice their privacy. In this paper, we propose a new approach for sets representation, which denotes sets by bit vectors and naturally hides the cardinality of a set. The new approach is particularly suitable to cloud computing environments. Then, we present two practical PSI and PSI cardinality protocols based on an additive homomorphic public-key cryptosystem (PKC). The new protocols enjoy two main advantages: 1) they are more efficient than other related protocols, especially when the set size is less than 2 12 and 2) the approach used in our protocols provides a good solution to securely store users' datasets, and the encrypted datasets could be used as protocols' messages directly without any additional computations. Finally, we implement our PSI and PSI cardinality protocols with Paillier PKC and ElGamal PKC in Java.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private set intersection (PSI) allows two parties P A and P B with respective input sets S A and S B to compute the intersection S A ∩ S B without revealing any information but the intersection itself. PSI has many important applications such as personal properties matching, data sharing, or data mining. Many PSI protocols have been presented that could be divided into three main approaches: (a) PSI based on the public-key cryptosystem (PKC), (b) PSI based on the generic protocols, and (c) PSI based on the oblivious transfer (OT) schemes.
Although there are many studies on the PSI protocols, there is still a long way to go before they can be applied in the practical real-world environments, mainly because of two reasons: (a) the insufficient efficiency of current PSI protocols and (b) not considering the secure storage of users' datasets.
Most current PSI protocols don't consider how to securely
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Muhammad Imran Tariq. store users' datasets, especially for outourcing and storing datasets on the cloud server. In these protocols, in order to provide confidentiality, users' datasets must be encrypted for secure storing, and the encrypted datasets must be decrypted first when running the protocol. These operations result in a lot of additional computations. Thus, storing users' datasets securely on the cloud server and executing the PSI protocols without any additional computations, has become an important application problem.
A. MOTIVATING SCENARIOS
The motivation for our works comes from scenarios where users' subsets are selected from a fixed domain on the server and are need to oursource and store on the cloud server. The following three scenarios need our PSI implementations.
1) PERSONAL PROPERTIES MATCHING
When a user registers to a service it is often essential to identify himself with his personal properties, which are often chosen from a cloud server. For example, on a dating website, users often need to choose his properties such as hobbies or interests, then they mostly want to find friends with the same properties. This operation can be done by sending users' properties list to others and matching them, but users' whole properties are revealed. If we run a PSI protocol between users' properties list, users' privacy is preserved. In these scenarios, the whole personal properties are often fixed and stored on the cloud server, and users select their subsets of properties from the server and store the encrypted subsets on the server.
2) MEDICAL INFORMATION SHARING
Medical information sharing provides a global view for disease treatment and prevention. However, medical data are very sensitive. In order to protect users' private medical information, it's necessary to securely handle shared medical data and apply PSI to perform these computations. In these scenarios, when users or hospitals record medical information, they often need input types of diseases, symptoms, treatments and so on, which are often selected from a fixed domain.
3) PRIVATE COMPETITION INFORMATION DISCOVERY
Two competing companies both want to expand business and invest in the international metropolises. To reduce competition and maximize investment returns, they hope not to invest in the same city but not leak the detailed cities that have been chosen to invest. Thus, they need to compute set-intersection cardinality securely. PSI cardinality protocol is need in this scenario where the whole international metropolises are fixed.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
Our main goal is designing efficient PSI protocols for the cloud computing environments, where users can securely store datasets on the cloud server and execute the PSI protocols without any additional computations. Our contributions are shown as follows:
1) NEW APPROACH TO REPRESENT SETS
Our new approach is representing sets by bit vectors. A set X selected from a fixed domain with n elements (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is denoted as a bit vector (b 1 , . . . , b n ), where if the bit
With this representation, we could get the set intersection and set intersection cardinality by the vector operations. This approach is particularly suitable to the cloud computing environments, and it naturally hides the cardinality of a set because the length of bit vector is always n.
2) EFFICIENT PSI PROTOCOLS BASED ON NEW APPROACH OF SETS REPRESENTATION
Based on the bit vector representation, we propose a PSI protocol. Each bit of a set vector is encrypted in advance by using an additive homomorphic PKC and the ciphertexts are stored on the cloud server. Then user P B uses his ciphertexts directly and sends them to user P A , P A computes the ciphertexts of two vectors' multiplication by using the additive homomorphic property of PKC and sends them to P B , then P B decrypts them and learns the results. We give a detailed formal simulated-based security proof in the semi-honest adversaries model. In the new PSI protocol, (a) a more efficient homomorphic PKC -ElGamal cryptosystem is suitable to our need, since the plaintexts are selected from a small domain; (b) many complex calculations such as all the encryptions could be calculated in advance, these optimizations make our protocol be more efficient than other PSI protocols especially when the set size is less than 2 12 ; and (c) our protocol provides a good solution to securely store users' datasets and use the encrypted datasets as protocols' message directly. Finally, we extend our approach to design an efficient PSI cardinality protocol.
3) IMPLEMENTATIONS OF NEW PSI PROTOCOLS
We implement our PSI and PSI cardinality protocols with Paillier PKC and ElGamal PKC in Java. Our implementation uses java.math.BigInteger for the large arithmetic operations, java.security for the secure random number generation, and javax.crypto for the key pair management. We give a detailed analysis of implementations, and get that: (a) the ElGamal-based versions of the protocols are more efficient than the Paillier-based versions, except for the PSI cardinality protocol with the set size more than 2 16 ; (b) the preprocesses can greatly improve the efficiency of the protocols; (c) the runtime of the protocols is in millisecond order, thus there is almost no delay in the execution of the protocols when the set size is less than 2 12 , and it is suitable to the practical applications.
II. RELATED WORKS
We review the related works by the following two topics: (a) designing techniques for PSI protocols, and (b) how to represent the elements of sets to a smaller domain.
A. DESIGNING TECHNIQUES FOR PSI PROTOCOLS
The main designing approaches for PSI protocols are, (a) PSI based on PKC, (b) PSI based on the generic protocols, and (c) PSI based on OT schemes.
1) PSI BASED ON PKC
In 1986, Meadows [1] first proposed a PSI protocol based on Diffie-Hellmann (DH) key exchange protocol, which used the commutative properties of DH function for private credentials matching and allowed two parties to verify if their credentials match to some degree. The protocol required a trusted third party when signing up for the system, but did not require it to be available when running the protocol. In 2004, based on the homomorphic PKC, balanced hashing and polynomial interpolation, Freedman et al. [2] presented two efficient PSI protocols: one in the semi-honest adversaries model and one in the malicious adversaries model, which were secure respectively in the standard model and in the random oracle model (ROM). A similar approach that used oblivious pseudorandom functions (OPRF) to perform PSI was proposed in Freedman et al. [3] . In 2005, Kissner and Song [4] gave a multi-sets PSI protocol secure against malicious adversaries based on polynomial interpolation over ring and additive homomorphic PKC. And they extended it to several variations of PSI: PSI cardinality, threshold PSI, and over-threshold PSI. In 2010, Cristofaro and Tsudik [5] showed a PSI protocol based on blind-RSA PKC, which scaled linearly in the number of elements. In 2015, Debnath and Dutta [6] proposed PSI, PSI cardinality, and authenticated PSI protocols based on multiplicative homomorphic PKC and Bloom filter [7] . In 2016, Freedman et al. [8] extended the approach of [2] , proposed PSI protocols with linear communication and computation overhead, showed a formal simulation-based security proof in the malicious adversaries model, and evaluated the practical efficiency of the proposed PSI protocols.
Recently, Abadi et al. [9] , [10] presented two delegated PSI protocols for the outsourced public cloud systems [11] based on additive homomorphic PKC and point-value set representation. In the protocols, clients encrypted their datasets by representing them as blinded polynomials independently, outsourced and stored the blinded datasets on the cloud server, and the blinded datasets could be used directly when running the protocols.
2) PSI BASED ON GENERIC PROTOCOLS
Generic secure multi-party computation protocols allow parties to securely evaluate any function that can be expressed as a Boolean circuit. The two main approaches for generic secure computation on Boolean circuits are Yao's garbled circuits [12] and Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson [13] construction. In 2012, Huang et al. [14] presented several Boolean circuits for PSI and implemented them by Yao's garbled circuits in Java. Their implementation scaled very well with increasing security parameter and outperformed Cristofaro and Tsudik's [5] protocol for larger security parameter. Zahur et al. [15] introduced a new approach to simultaneously garble AND gates with two ciphertexts and XOR gates with zero ciphertexts that resulted in smaller garbled circuits than any prior schemes, and used it to improve Huang et al.'s PSI protocol. In 2015, Pinkas et al. [16] designed an efficient circuit-based PSI protocol by using the permutation-based hashing [17] , which was up to 5 times faster than Huang et al.'s construction [14] . In 2018, Pinkas et al. [18] further optimized the circuit-based PSI protocols against semi-honest adversaries.
3) PSI BASED ON OT SCHEMES
In 2013, Dong et al. [19] presented an efficient PSI protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries based on a garbled Bloom filter and OT extension, which had linear complexity, relied mostly on symmetric key operations, and was suitable to large scale data processing. In 2014, Pinkas et al. [20] optimized the semi-honest adversaries version of [19] by using random OT extension [21] . Pinkas et al.'s OT-based PSI protocol [20] was extended to security against weakly malicious adversaries by Rindal and Rosulek [22] , and to security against a semi-honest party and a malicious party by Lambak [23] . In 2015, Pinkas et al. [16] improved [20] by using the permutation-based hashing. In 2016, Kolesnikov et al. [24] gave a lightweight protocol for OPRF based on the OT extension protocol of Kolesnikov and Kumaresan [25] in the semi-honest adversaries model, and used it to improve Pinkas et al.'s construction [16] . In 2017, Rindal and Rosulek [26] showed an OT-based PSI protocol secure in the malicious model based on Bloom filter, and gave the first implementation of a malicious secure PSI protocol, which computed the intersection of two sets with a million elements each in 200 s. In 2018, Pinkas et al. [18] showed significant optimizations to the OT-based PSI protocols against semi-honest adversaries, and gave an OT-based PSI protocol by using the efficient OPRF [24] and the hashing techniques, which was more efficient than other existing protocols.
B. HASHING INPUTS TO A SMALLER DOMAIN
How to represent the elements of sets to a smaller domain is an important problem, since the performance of most PSI protocols depends on the length of the representation of the elements. If the original representation is sparse, we could map the elements to values with a smaller domain using hashing techniques. Then we can achieve a more efficient execution by running the original protocol on the new representation. To hide the number of elements that are mapped to a bin, each bins must contain max b elements, and dummy elements need to be padded to a bin if the size of real elements is less than max b . This maximum bin size must ensure that no bin will contain more than max b real elements with probability > 2 −η , where η is the hash failure parameter and usually η = 30. Gonnet [27] showed that max b = ln n ln ln n (1 + o (1)) with high probability where b = n and n is the number of a set. Then, Raab and Steger [28] and Mitzenmacher [29] analyzed the parameters of the simplest hashing extensively.
2) CUCKOO HASHING
In order to avoid collisions, Pagh and Rodler [30] introduced Cuckoo hashing, which uses k hash functions h 1 , . . . , h k :
with b bins. The placement strategy is as follows: (1) an element e is inserted into a bin B h 1 (e), the placement is done if the bin B h 1 (e) is empty; otherwise (2) the prior content o of B h 1 (e) are evicted to a new bin
3) the procedure is repeated until no more evictions are necessary or until k relocations have been performed; (4) in the latter case, the last element is put in a special stash. A lookup for Cuckoo hashing is very efficient because it only compares e with the k items in (B h 1 (e), . . . , B h k (e)) and to the s items in the stash. The hash failure probability is determined by three parameters: the number of hash functions k, the number of bins b, and the stash size s. Then, Kirsch et al. [31] and Dietzfelbinger et al. [32] gave a detailed analysis to the parameters of Cuckoo hashing.
3) PERMUTATION-BASED HASHING
Arbitman et al. [17] introduced a permutation-based hashing technique, which can reduce the bit-length of the stored elements by a Feistel-like structure. The element x is mapped to a bin x L h(x R ) and the stored value in the bin is x R , where h is a hash function h : {0,
In the permutation-based hashing, the value stored in the bin is x R with |x R | = |x| − log b, which is shorter than the length of the original element.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the used primitives, such as additive homomorphic PKC. 
We denote it by X ≡ Y . An additive homomorphic PKC scheme has a multiplication property:
b .
1) PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM
The Paillier cryptosystem is an additive homomorphic PKC based on the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption [33] , which has three algorithms as follows:
• Key Generation: KeyGen → (sk, pk). Select two large primes of similar bit length (p, q), compute N = pq and λ = LCM (p − 1, q − 1), and choose a random generator g of Z * N 2 , where LCM (p − 1, q − 1) is the least common multiple of p−1 and q−1. Then, set (N , g) as the public key pk and λ as the private key sk.
• Encryption: c = En pk (m) = g m r N mod N 2 , where r ∈ Z * N 2 is a random number.
2) ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM
A variable of ElGamal cryptosystem [34] is an additive homomorphic PKC based on the decisional DiffieHellman(DDH) assumption, which has three algorithms as follows:
• Key Generation: KeyGen → (sk, pk). Let G be a group with a large prime order q and g be a generator. Choose a random secret private key x from Z q , compute the public key y = g x mod q.
• Encryption: c = En pk (m) = (c 1 , c 2 ) = (g r mod q, g m y r mod q), where r ∈ Z q is a random number.
• Decryption: g m = Dec sk (c) = c 2 (c 1 ) x mod q. We can get m by a brute searching if m is in a small domain.
C. SECURITY MODEL
The security model is formalized by the real-ideal simulation paradigm. Assume be a protocol that computes a functionality f (x 1 , · · · , x n ) = (y 1 , · · · , y n ), where each party P i has his private input x i and wants to get his output y i . The actual protocol is called the real model, and the ideal model is a model where has a trustful third party who securely gets parties' inputs (x 1 , · · · , x n ), computes f (x 1 , · · · , x n ) and outputs y i to P i .
We consider a static semi-honest setting, where adversaries are honest-but-curious, i.e. they will follow the protocol specification but try to get more information about the honest parties' inputs/outputs. In the semi-honest adversaries model, a protocol is secure if whatever can be learnt by an adversary in the real model can be obtained by a simulation in the ideal model. The formal security model is captured by the following definitions.
Definition 5: Views in the real model The views of an adversary A during an execution of a protocol for a functionality f includes the inputs, outputs and internal random coins of the corrupted parties, and the messages sent between the parties, and are denoted by Real ,A (x 1 , · · · , x n ) where x i is the input of party P i . 
Definition 6: Views in the ideal model
The views of a simulation Sim in the ideal model are denoted by Ideal f ,Sim (x 1 , · · · , x n ) where x i is the input of party P i .
Definition 7: Security of a protocol computing a functionality f securely in the semi-honest adversaries model Protocol is said to securely compute f in the semi-honest adversaries model, if for every PPT adversary A in the real model, there exists a PPT simulator Sim in the ideal model such that,
IV. REPRESENTATIONS OF SETS & THEIR OPERATIONS
We introduce a new approach to represent sets by bit vectors, then we can compute set intersection and set intersection cardinality by vectors operations based on the new bit vector representation.
A. SET REPRESENTATION
Suppose sets be selected from a fixed domain that has n elements denoted by (s 1 , . . . , s n ). A bit vector (b 1 , . . . , b n ) is used to denote a set X , if the bit b i = 1(1 ≤ i ≤ n) means that s i ∈ X , else s i / ∈ X . This representation naturally hides the cardinality of a set because the length of bit vectors is always n.
Typical application scenarios for this representation are shown in figure 1 , where the cloud server has all the elements of an ordered set and users select their subsets from the cloud server. For example, in the personal properties matching system, the cloud server has the whole personal properties with a fixed order: (optimistic, active, independent, outgoing, jogging, running, badminton, football, music, drawing, reading, travelling, . . .), user B selects his own properties: (optimistic, outgoing, badminton, drawing, travelling, . . .). Then, the properties set S B of user B is denoted by 100100100101 . . . that means user B's properties are (optimistic, outgoing, badminton, drawing,  travelling, . . .) .
B. REPRESENTATION OF SET-INTERSECTION
Based on the bit vector representation, the intersection S 1 ∩S 2 of two sets S 1 and S 2 could be computed by multiplying the elements in the corresponding position of the vector S 1 and the vector S 2 , which is shown as follows:
In formula (1), the symbol * indicates that two row vectors of the same length are computed by multiplying the elements in the corresponding position to obtain a new vector.
C. REPRESENTATION OF SET-INTERSECTION CARDINALITY
Based on the bit vector representation, the intersection cardinality |S 1 ∩ S 2 | of two sets S 1 and S 2 could be computed by the inner product of the vector S 1 and the vector S 2 , which is shown as follows:
V. NEW PRIVATE SET-INTERSECTION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present our new PSI protocols based on the bit vector representation of sets and additive homomorphic PKC.
A. THE PROPOSED PSI PROTOCOL
The proposed protocol is used to securely compute two-sets intersection that is defined as a functionality f (S A , S B ) = (⊥, S A ∩ S B ), where two parties P A and P B with respective input sets S A and S B together execute the functionality f and P A gets nothing, P B learns the intersection without any more information. 
). Then, each party outputs his public key and stores the ciphertexts on the cloud server or other storage mediums. 
In the step 2 of the set intersection stage, (P A ) s privacy is preserved by appropriately multiplying a ciphertext of zero. Based on the additive homomorphic property, e i = (c i )
, thus multiplying En pk B (0) has no effect on the calculation results. However, if we don't multiple En pk B (0), then e i = c i or e i = 1 because b A i is 1 or 0, thus b A i is completely leaked due to e i . Remark 2: In the PSI protocol, an additive homomorphic PKC is need, such as Paillier Cryptosystem. A variable of ElGamal cryptosystem described in Section 3.2 is also suitable to our protocol because plaintexts m are in a small domain and could be learnt by the original decrypting and a brute searching. Here plaintext m is 1 or 0. One might prefer using the ElGamal-based version of the protocol because ElGamal PKC is much faster than Paillier PKC with comparable security.
Remark 3: In the PSI protocol, all plaintexts b B i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and zeros are known, then all encryptions could be calculated in advance. Thus, one can improve the efficiency of the protocol with preprocessing by encrypting all plaintexts in advance.
B. CORRECTNESS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The correctness of the PSI protocol is shown as follows:
Because,
Thus, the proposed protocol is correct.
C. SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Theorem 1: The above PSI protocol is secure in the semi-honest adversaries model.
Proof: We will show our proofs by two cases where one party is corrupted and the other is honest. In each case, we will construct a simulator in the ideal model such that the ideal views are computationally indistinguishable with the real views of the adversary A during an execution of new PSI protocol .
Case 1: Corrupted Party P A . In this case, a simulator Sim is constructed, which corrupts the party P A in the ideal model and simulates the views as follows:
(1) Sim generates a public/private key pair (pk B , sk B ), and sends pk B to P A ; (2) Sim acts as P B and activates the protocol . For each In the real execution, A's views are
Based on the semantic security property of PKC,
(b) In the simulation step 3, In this case, a simulator Sim is constructed, which corrupts the party P B in the ideal model and simulates the views as follows:
(1) Sim generates a public/private key pair (pk B , sk B ), and sends (pk B , sk B ) to P B ;
(2) Sim acts as P A and activates the protocol . Upon received (c i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) In the real execution, A's views are
Based on the semantic security property of PKC, From the analysis of Case 1 and Case 2, we get the above protocol securely computes the set intersection in the semi-honest adversaries model.
D. EXTENDING TO PSI CARDINALITY PROTOCOL
Our approach can be extended to design a very efficient PSI cardinality protocol. Two-sets intersection cardinality is defined as a functionality f (S A , S B ) = (⊥, |S A ∩ S B |), where two parties P A and P B with respective input sets S A and S B together execute the functionality f and P A gets nothing, P B learns the intersection cardinality without any more information.
In the PSI cardinality protocol, the variable of ElGamal PKC described in Section 3.2 is also suitable to our need because the set-intersection cardinality is a small value and could be decrypted by a brute searching; and not only all encryptions could be calculated in advance, but also the exponentiation computations g m (0 ≤ m ≤ n) could be done first for a faster brute searching decryption. Figure 3 shows the proposed PSI cardinality protocol, which includes the following two stages:
Setup stage It's the same as the PSI protocol. Set Intersection Cardinality stage: Two parties run the following steps:
1) It's the same as the PSI protocol; 2) Upon received c i (
, and sends (e) to P B ; 3) Upon received (e), P B computes s = Dec sk B (e), s is the cardinality of S A S B . Correctness of the proposed protocol. The correctness of the PSI cardinality protocol is shown as follows:
VI. SECURE IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We implement our protocols with Paillier PKC and ElGamal PKC in Java. Our implementations use java.math.BigInteger for large arithmetic operations, java.security for secure random number generation, and javax.crypto for key pair management. The keys and modulus sizes that offer comparable security are: a 1024-bit value for N in Paillier PKC (and thus a 2048-bit modulus for N 2 ) and a 160-bit key and 1024-bit prime modulus for ElGamal. In the protocols all the encryptions could be calculated in advance, and in ElGamal-based version of the PSI cardinality protocol, the exponentiation computations g m (0 ≤ m ≤ n) could be done first for a faster 16 ; (b) the preprocesses can greatly improve the efficiency of the protocols; (c) there is almost no delay in the execution of the protocols when n ≤ 2 12 that is the majority of practical applications because the runtime of the protocols is in millisecond order.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We evaluate our PSI protocol by comparing with other related PSI protocols that are PKC-based protocols [5] , [10] , generic protocols based protocol [14] and OT-based protocols [18] , [20] . We compare these protocols in terms of four properties: simulated-based security, natural secure data storage, needing secure channel or not and runtime. We implement these protocols in C, while ours in Java, and measure the execution times of all the protocols on the same environment: an Intel(R)Core TM i7 − 7700HQ @ 3.6GHz CPU, 8 GBRAM processor with one thread in the LAN setting. The results are summarized in Table 3 , which show that our PSI protocol enjoys the following advantages: (a) our protocol provides a formal detailed simulated-based security proof, which [14] and [20] only give an informal security analysis; (b) in our protocol, a natural secure data storage is given, it's possible to outsource and store datasets on the cloud server and use the encrypted datasets directly when executing the protocol, while in [5] , [14] , [20] and [18] , if datasets are outsourced and stored on the cloud server, they must be encrypted first and be decrypted in advance when using them; (c) a normal channel is suitable to our need, while a secure channel is need in [10] because from the message e i , P B could learn τ (A) (x i ) and then the set of P A ; (d) based on the runtime analysis, our protocol is more efficient than others especially when the set size less than 2 12 .
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We proposed a new sets representation approach, which is particularly suitable to the cloud computing environments and naturally hides the cardinality of a set. Then, according to the new representation, we gave two practical PSI and PSI cardinality protocols, which provided a good solution to securely store users' datasets and use the encrypted datasets as protocols' message directly. The new protocols are more efficient than other related protocols especially when the set size is less than 2 12 . Lastly, we implemented Paillier-based version and ElGamal-based version of two protocols in Java. How to extend our approach to multi-parties setting and delegated PSI in the cloud computing environments are our future works. 
